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Introduction 
 
 In 1953, the American Library Association (ALA) and the United States 
government would find themselves at odds with one another over the presence of 
Communist and “subversive” books in the Department of State’s overseas libraries.  
Reactions to the growing Communist threat, which many government officials perceived 
to be spreading rampantly around the world, would ultimately cause the ALA and 
segments of the government to take opposing sides during a Joseph McCarthy led 
investigation of the overseas library programs.  This divergence of opinion, however, was 
hardly a spontaneous reaction by librarians.  For the ALA, events which had been begun 
in the late 1930s marked the beginning of an increasingly mobilized effort by the library 
profession to combat all forms of censorship.  By 1953, the publicly expressed opposition 
to censorship by the ALA could be seen as the culmination of a series of increasingly 
concerted efforts to protect intellectual freedom not only within libraries, but society as a 
whole.   
 The immediate post-war plans implemented by the U.S. would soon prove to be 
of great significance to the social and economic development of the nation at home and in 
its standing around the globe.  With much of the world nations literally exhausted by the 
tremendous conflict that was the Second World War, it seemed logical (and perhaps a bit 
idealistic) to conclude that the time was ripe for world peace.  However, not long after the 
Germans and Japanese surrendered to Allied forces, the U.S. found itself locked in 
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another world struggle, one of uncompromising ideologies with overtones of extreme 
violence. 
 It was within the framework of this ideological fight that the ALA also went 
through a dramatic evolution.  Just as the nation as a whole went through a change during 
the post-war development, the library profession itself saw significant developments 
occur as a result of the nation’s post-war planning.  These changes were most heavily felt 
in the profession’s stance on censorship and “intellectual freedom,” at home and 
eventually abroad with the overseas library programs of the State Department.  Prior to 
WWII, the ALA had taken few public stances in favor of intellectual freedom within 
libraries.  Many librarians were completely comfortable going along with (and at times 
instigating) attempts to remove certain offensive and controversial materials from the 
shelves of various libraries.1  In addition, the ALA lacked a consensual stance on these 
issues.  As a result, organizational support for individual librarians who resisted efforts to 
curb intellectual freedom was practically non-existent.  However, in 1939, when the first 
Library Bill of Rights was created, the profession’s stance on censorship and intellectual 
freedom within the library began to change. 
 After WWII, and throughout the 1940s, the ALA became increasingly outspoken 
against censorship of thought within libraries.  This change within the ALA set the stage 
for a confrontation between the ALA and the US Government.  In the years leading up to 
WWII, the ALA had worked to establish several overseas library programs in Europe 
(Paris) and in Latin America.  The purpose was to foster cultural exchange between 
nations, and many librarians (and non-librarians alike) believed books could be an 
influential component in creating awareness and understanding of the United States and 
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its culture.  After WWII, the U.S. government continued this line of thought; however 
they did so from a different perspective.  Using the Communist threat overseas as a 
justification, the U.S. began to work towards expanding overseas information programs 
in order to counter Communist propaganda abroad.  However, what had previously been 
a system designed for cultural exchange between nations quickly became one of explicit 
American propaganda.  This change would mark a dramatic shift from the original goals 
of cultural exchange within the overseas library programs originally envisioned by the 
ALA and its leaders; as a result it would lead the ALA to become increasingly outspoken 
and critical of the government’s information programs as it fought for intellectual 
freedom. 
 In order to understand why events in 1953 transpired as they did, it is necessary to 
understand how and why the ALA came to exist as it did in 1953.  As will be shown, the 
government’s increasingly severe reaction to communism at home and abroad essentially 
pushed the library profession to review its own ideals, and consequently strengthened 
many librarians’ resolve to fight for the preservation of intellectual freedom. 
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I 
 
The American Library Association and the  
Roots of Intellectual Freedom 
 In the 1930s, as the library profession began to assert more “professional 
autonomy,” librarians gradually began to push for greater control over the selection of 
books within the public library.  The initial efforts undertaken by the ALA would provide 
a foundation upon which the profession would continue to build.  These are the roots of 
this struggle, and while the initial hopes stemming from these early efforts were not 
realized as fully as some hoped at the time, they nevertheless established an important 
foundation. 
 Down with censorship, up with intellectual freedom; the library profession had 
not always been this way.  In years before, librarians acted as willing participants when it 
came to censoring certain books from the general public.1  However, as the dire effects of 
totalitarian oppression around the globe became increasingly apparent to the ALA and 
others, the library profession became more open to offering a wider representation of 
viewpoints within the library.  Librarians began to advocate more neutrality in book 
selection. This would certainly not be the final time the profession took a stance on 
maintaining free and open shelves to all areas of thought, it was a dramatic shift away 
from past practice 
                                                 
1 For a book length treatment of this subject, see:  Evelyn Geller, Forbidden Books in American Public 
Libraries, 1876-1939: A Study in Cultural Change (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984). 
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Library Bill of Rights (1939) 
 In November 1938, the board of the Des Moines Public Library adopted a “Bill of 
Rights for the Free Public Library.”  Written by the library’s director, Forrest Spaulding, 
the Des Moines Bill of Rights statement came about as a result of “growing intolerance, 
suppression of free speech and censorship,” which the librarians disturbingly saw to be 
taking place around the world.  In the original statement, Spaulding held that the selection 
of books should be done based on a book’s “value and interest” regardless of “the race, 
nationality, political, or religious views of the writer.”  The previous month, Bernard 
Berelson had written in the Wilson Library Bulletin (WLB) that librarians needed to 
“stand firmly against social and political and economic censorship of book collections; it 
must be so organized that it can present effective opposition to this censorship and it must 
protect librarians who are threatened by it.”2  The Des Moines Library Bill of Rights 
would serve as a first step towards achieving this type of professional support nationwide.   
 Several incidents in the late 1930s propelled the American Library Association to 
begin reconsidering the profession’s stance on intellectual freedom.  In 1937, a librarian 
at the University of Montana named Philip O. Keeney lost his tenured position with the 
university.  The official reasoning had to do with an “incompatibility” of library 
philosophy that clashed with the school’s president.  However, many saw the cause for 
his dismissal to be much different.3  When asked about the case, one librarian at Montana 
responded by saying “Professor Keeney, according to the facts, has lost his position 
because he attempted to include in his library material on all sides of the social and 
economic trends of our time.”4
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 John Steinbeck would prove to be the final straw for the ALA.  Published in 1939, 
Steinbeck’s novel The Grapes of Wrath came under intense public scrutiny, primarily for 
the social views espoused by its author as well as the overall “immorality” of the work.5  
Collier’s decried the novel as being “propaganda for the idea that we ought to change our 
system for the Russian system” and the Associated Farmers of Kern County, California 
described it as “propaganda in its vilest form.”6  The book was banned, among other 
places, in the libraries in East St. Louis, Illinois; Camden, New Jersey; Bakersfield, 
California; and several other libraries around the country.7  Prior to this public outcry 
against The Grapes of Wrath, the American Education Board had urged the ALA to take 
up the Des Moines library statement at the upcoming 1939 Annual Conference in San 
Francisco.  The Steinbeck controversy only strengthened this call to address the growing 
concerns of censorship on a national level.  And so, with the Des Moines standard to 
build upon, and with a sense of growing unease towards recent infringements upon 
intellectual freedom, the ALA moved to adopt its own version of a library bill of rights.  
At the 1939 annual convention, the issue was brought before the ALA council.  
Opposition to the Library Bill of Rights was virtually non-existent within the council, and 
little discussion was needed for it to pass unanimously.8   
 The 1939 ALA statement differed from the Des Moines statement in several 
ways.  First, Article II of the original statement called for equal representation “in the 
selection of books on subjects about which differences of opinion exist.”  The ALA 
council changed the word “equal” to “fair and adequate” to account for the fact that 
equal, in terms of actual number of volumes, would almost certainly be an impossible 
task for librarians to collect.  Second, Article III of the Des Moines statement was 
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completely cut because it addressed an individual library’s budget and patron needs.  
Finally, Article IV of the Des Moines statement was broadened from:  “Library meeting 
rooms shall be available on equal terms to all organized nonprofit groups for open 
meetings to which no admission fee is charged and from which no one is excluded” to 
“Library meeting rooms should be available on equal terms to all groups in the 
community regardless of their beliefs or affiliations.”  Following the approval by the 
Library Bill of Rights, the ALA Council recommended the statement to individual 
governing boards of libraries around the country.9   
 As important as an official statement like the Library Bill of Rights was for the 
defense of intellectual freedom in libraries, it was nevertheless deficient on several levels.  
The most glaring omission from the statement was its failure to define how the ALA 
would uphold its Bill of Rights.  It failed to mention what the ALA would do to support 
any library or librarian who fought to uphold the principles espoused in the statement.  
Furthermore, it did not explicitly call for librarians to oppose censorship and it was 
limited to public libraries in the United States.10  Finally, all discussion of propaganda in 
the library was left out of the ALA version.  The ALA’s statement lacked the 
commitment found in the Des Moines which obligated a library to actively seek out 
within and avoid collecting overt propaganda from all sides.11  As will be shown later, 
this omission would later become an extremely pertinent topic.  Within the next decade 
the issue of propaganda would rear its head in a rather explicit way in regards to the 
overseas libraries, and the ALA would be forced to reexamine (and revise) its original 
Library Bill of Rights statement.  Before doing so, however, it would have to establish 
some way to uphold the principles being espoused. 
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Committee on Intellectual Freedom 
 The 1940 Annual Conference in Cincinnati saw the issue of censorship and 
subversive propaganda move to the front of issues discussed.  Shortly after the adoption 
of the Library Bill of Rights in 1939, a Special Committee on Censorship was appointed.  
This special committee included Sterling North, Alfred C. Nielsen, and Forrest 
Spaulding, recent author of the Des Moines Library Bill of Rights of Rights statement.  
With the threat of war overseas looking increasingly likely, calls for restricting all forms 
of propaganda deemed to be subversive increased in 1940.  Because the Library Bill of 
Rights had largely avoided this issue, the job of reviewing the ALA’s policies on 
censoring propaganda was given to the special committee.  They were to report their 
findings to the ALA council at the Annual Conference in Cincinnati later that summer.12
 At the Annual Conference, the issue of restricting subversive material was 
debated by Gilbert Bettman and Arthur Garfield Hays.  Bettman, former attorney general 
of Ohio, favored the idea, arguing that Americans did not want their democracy to be 
undermined by “the purposively poisoned arrows” of authoritarian propaganda.  Public 
librarians, therefore, were obligated by an almost moral duty to restrict access to such 
materials.  On the opposing side, Hays, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union, 
argued that such restriction was in itself an undemocratic act.  As a result, limiting access 
for dissent and opposing views would in no way be an appropriate policy for a library to 
take.13  Both of these arguments would continue to surface during debates involving 
intellectual freedom.   
 Under the shadow of this debate surrounding the conference, the Special 
Committee reported to the ALA Council.  In their report, they told the council that if the 
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Library Bill of Rights were to mean anything, further protection and support would have 
to be given to librarians.14  It would not be enough to simply encourage librarians to 
resist efforts to censor certain books.  These were real people working in the library and 
facing very real community members, groups and individuals who could certainly present 
a grave threat to the employment of a librarian who challenged their calls for censorship 
of certain materials.  There had to be some form of national organizational support to 
back these librarians in their effort.  The special committee called for a permanent 
committee to be established which would support librarians.  The ALA council 
unanimously accepted this proposal, thus creating the Committee on Intellectual Freedom 
to Safeguard the Rights of Library Users to Freedom of Inquiry.15∗   
 Perhaps it was simply a case of bad timing, but the build up for the oncoming war 
effort greatly hindered the IFC’s efforts to establish itself as an organization with teeth.  
Despite many concerns throughout the country regarding various attacks on democracy 
around the world, the idea of intellectual freedom was simply not a prominent concern 
among many individual librarians.  The idea of defending democracy by defending 
intellectual freedom had not yet sunk in on a nationwide scale.  In a poll conducted by the 
Wilson Library Bulletin in January 1940, only 7 percent of librarians perceived threats to 
the Bill of Rights to be “the most vital library problem today.”  Instead, 28 percent 
believed the “need of funds” was the most pressing issue, with “Need to extend library 
services” coming in second at 20 percent.16  
 Although the ALA had worked diligently to first create a set of guidelines for 
librarians and then an organization to support librarians who followed those guidelines, it 
                                                 
∗ In 1947 the name was shortened to the Committee on Intellectual Freedom.  It is now known as the 
Intellectual Freedom Committee, or IFC.  From here on, “IFC” will be used to refer to this organization. 
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still had a way to go to win over librarians as a whole.  For many people, the looming 
possibility of war took precedence over a war of ideals on the home front.  Once the US 
entered the war, and as it slowly progressed, the IFC became seemingly irrelevant.  By 
1942, and through 1943, it was not even active.17  Not until after WWII would the ALA 
succeed in earning widespread support for its fight against censorship.  The issue would 
first hit at home, but would soon escalate to overseas as the US government underwent 
plans to defeat communist propaganda with its own form of propaganda, which included 
the use of libraries as part of a new post-war reconstruction effort.  As a result, in years 
following the Second World War, developments both within the ALA and the 
government’s overseas information programs would send the two sides down a path of 
inevitable confrontation.  For this to happen, however, there would first have to be an 
established precedent for an international program of information and cultural exchange 
that included libraries.   
 12
 
 
 
 
II 
 
International Cultural Exchange, the Development of Overseas 
Library Programs, and the Use of Propaganda Abroad 
 
 By the Second World War, the United States’ overseas information services were 
still a relatively new venture for the country.  For various reasons, participation in a 
worldwide cultural exchange was something that had been tenaciously avoided for many 
years.  Despite Melvil Dewey’s 1919 call for the library profession to become 
“missionaries of the book,” the ALA lagged behind with the rest of the country in large-
scale efforts to foster international cultural exchange after the First World War.  Recent 
past efforts had demonstrated signs of optimism for such cultural exchange.  During the 
WWI, the ALA had worked with the State Department to provide reading materials for 
soldiers fighting overseas.  By 1920, efforts to continue library work abroad took an 
encouraging step forward when the first American public library opened in Paris.  
However, while this international movement would remain committed to cultural 
exchange abroad, it would remain relatively small and largely informal as the rest of the 
country fell back into complacent isolationism.18
International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions 
 This attitude began to change in 1927 with the creation of the International 
Federation of Library Associations (IFLA).  The direct roots of the IFLA can be traced 
back to 1926 and a man by the name of Gabriel Henriot.  In 1926, at the International 
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Congress of Librarians and Booklovers in Prague, Henriot called for the creation of an 
international library committee.  At the time, Henriot was the President of the 
Association des Bibliothécaires Français and a professor at the American Library School 
in Paris.  Largely a European effort, Henriot worked with representatives from 
Czechoslovakia, England, Germany, and Sweden to draft a nine-point resolution for the 
creation of a Standing International Library Committee.  For additional support, Henriot 
began to pull the ALA in to the discussion, setting up the final resolution that was to be 
decided upon during the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the (British) Library 
Association in Edinburgh, Scotland 19
 On 30 September 1927, in Edinburgh, the IFLA was formed.20  With signatures 
by the delegates from fifteen countries (including the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Switzerland, France, and the U.S.), the final drafted resolution to create the IFLA was the 
result of several days of deliberations between seven members of a working group.  Isak 
Collinjn, chairman of the group and Swedish Riksbibliotekar, was elected to be the first 
president.  This resolution was intended to be a starting point for further discussion.  Two 
years later, at the first World Congress of Libraries and Bibliography, the statutes for the 
IFLA were written and agreed upon.21
 Coming on the heels of the ALA’s 1929 Annual conference in Washington, a 
group of fifteen international library delegates met in Rome for the first World Congress 
of Libraries and Bibliography.  Twelve hundred people attended the event, representing 
eighteen countries, with representatives from America that included Carl H. Milam (ALA 
Executive Secretary), Herbert Putnam (Librarian of Congress), Arthur Bostwick, and 
Andrew Keogh.22  At the conference, Benito Mussolini gave the welcoming address, and 
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his words were warmly received within the pages of Library Journal.  Pope Pius XI also 
made an appearance at the conference, temporarily leaving "his throne and his pontifical 
aloofness to mingle with his fellow librarians.”23  During one important address, Herbert 
Putnam promoted the idea of establishing an international system of libraries.  Doing so, 
he argued, would allow librarians from around the globe to pool library resources and 
share them on an international scale.24   
 Although the IFLA had come into being two years before, it was not until this 
conference that the official Statutes for the organization were adopted.  Written by the 
Carl Milam, the statutes were a significant contribution from the ALA.  With acceptance 
for the organization’s statutes solidified in Edinburgh, the IFLA was officially constituted 
as an international union of national library associations a year later at the 1930 
Stockholm Session.  The creation of this organization reflected a growing trend of 
librarians around the world who wished to see more direct involvement with one another.  
It was established with optimism, with hope that the international effort would be a 
stepping block in the interest of world peace.25   
Development of International Cultural Exchange 
 By the 1930s, the American effort to move beyond its borders intensified.  
Spurred by the efforts of Fascist regimes and their attempts to influence the Latin 
America populace, the State Department established the Division of Cultural Relations on 
27 July 1938.  The US decided it must prevent the spread of fascism in the region, and 
books and libraries became key components in this effort.  It was part of a recent 
emphasis on Pan-American Relations that had largely begun in 1933 with President 
Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy.”  The creation of such a department, while 
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seemingly minor in the grand scheme of things, marked a significant step forward for 
America’s efforts at cultural diplomacy.  When it came to cultural diplomacy, the US had 
significantly lagged behind Europe for many years.  Several reasons were the cause of 
this lack of effort, including the dominance of state and local governments and private 
institutions in education, a laissez-faire type reluctance by the federal government to 
intruded upon a traditionally private sector role, and a general fear of foreign 
entanglements which resulted in significant political isolation in the wake of WWI.  
Additionally, many within the U.S., including both government officials and the public, 
were hesitant to support an official policy involving cultural exchanges because such 
program tasted a bit too strongly of official state propaganda.  With the excessive 
propaganda abuses of the Committee of Public Information (a.k.a. Creel Commission) 
during the First World War still fresh in the public’s mind, many were hesitant to support 
additional propagandistic efforts abroad.26  As a result, the creation of the Division of 
Cultural Relations marked a significant development for proponents of international 
cultural relations. 
 Although the State Department had largely been responsible for the government’s 
focus of cultural exchange with Latin America, it desperately sought outside leadership 
from the private sector.  Among those the State Department worked most closely with 
was ALA Executive Secretary Carl Milam, who agreed to join the General Advisory 
Committee to the State Department to provide direction for the Division of Cultural 
Relations.  Despite his limited background in international relations, Milam was behind 
much of this effort for cultural exchange.  Through his leadership, the ALA came to be 
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highly regarded by the State Department as “an educational force of the greatest 
significance.” 27  
 During this time, the ALA began to refocus its own international library activities 
through the International Relations Board (IRB), created in 1942.  Four subcommittees 
were established to address library activities in specific areas of the world. The four 
subcommittees were: Aid to Libraries in War Areas, Library Cooperation with Latin 
America, Library Cooperation with Europe and Africa, and Library Cooperation with the 
Orient and South Pacific.  After the State Department created the Office of the 
Coordination of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) in 1940, headed by Nelson A. 
Rockefeller, the ALA continued to work closely with the government to promote book 
exchanges and American libraries throughout Latin America.28
 By the time WWII had ended, the ALA had developed a reputation for being at 
the forefront of international cultural relations as well as the representative model for 
American librarianship, something that would play a role in the post-WWII rebuilding 
effort overseas.  It also established the organization as a prominent proponent for 
overseas librarianship at the same time that some within the US Government were 
viewing these activities with a growing sense of importance for American global 
interests. 
ALA and Post-WWII Rebuilding Efforts 
 Like many industries and professions at the time, America’s entry into WWII 
following the attacks on Pearl Harbor helped spur the ALA to begin to think more 
seriously about librarianship on a truly international level, something that had been 
gradually building since the founding of the IFLA and with the recent library activities in 
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Latin America.  This rise in international library interests seems to have coincided with a 
decrease in support for intellectual freedom on the home front.  As the war effort both at 
home and abroad increased, however, the State Department started to feel less and less 
inclined to allow others control over the U.S. information programs overseas.  As a result, 
the U.S. government began to exert increasing control over these overseas activities.29
 In June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was created by an Executive 
Order of the White House with the purpose of countering Axis propaganda being 
disseminated abroad.  Despite trepidation over American propaganda being directed 
towards the American public, there was widespread public support for similar activities 
as long as they were aimed at foreign audiences.  However, while the public may have 
supported these endeavors, from its inception the OWI was racked with partisan 
opposition within Washington.  In actions that would later resurface during floor debates 
of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 (an act that would later make permanent the 
organization behind international information and cultural diplomacy activities of the 
U.S.), Republicans decried the agency as being nothing more than another New Deal-era 
program of the Roosevelt administration.  In addition to “traditional” feelings of 
isolationism, many of FDR’s political opponents feared that such an agency would be 
used to simply publicize and advocate the accomplishments of Roosevelt and his 
administration.  Bitter partisan rancor, however, did not prevent President Roosevelt from 
selecting his top choice Elmer Davis to serve as director of the organization, a man who 
prior to his appointment as head of the OWI had served as the chief news analyst for CBS 
radio.30   
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 The OWI was an amalgamation of four other wartime information related 
agencies.  These included the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Government 
Reports, the division of information of the Office for Emergency Management, and the 
Foreign Intelligence Service, Outpost, Publication, and Pictorial Branches of the Office 
of the Coordinator of Information.  While there were some domestic efforts undertaken, 
the OWI was officially charged with the duty of “disseminating information,” not 
molding public opinion at home.31  Part of this effort included libraries overseas, also 
known as information centers. 
 Following the war, however, the OWI faced a serious challenge for survival.  
Many political opponents of the New Deal disliked the continuation of another 
Roosevelt-era program, and one critic argued that the OWI had become “a hide-out for 
privileged intellectual New Deal cowards and Communists.”32  Further, the overall cost 
of the program, which by the war’s end had over 13,000 employees on its payroll, 
provided conservative Republican and Southern Democrat opponents in Congress with 
additional ammunition to attack the OWI.  Many independent media outlets also regarded 
the OWI with skepticism, viewing the agency as a “thin wedge of government control” 
over their own media activities.  Therefore, largely as a result of this opposition, the OWI 
was slated to close within weeks following the Japanese surrender in 14 August 1945.33
 Not every government official was so willing to abolish this overseas information 
and propaganda agency.  Shortly after the OWI was set to be terminated, President 
Truman signed an Executive Order transferring all functions of the OWI to the State 
Department.  This provisional agency became known as the Interim International 
Information Service (IIIA).  This move, however, did not prevent the agency from 
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succumbing to drastic financial cuts.  Over the next few months following the Japanese 
surrender, roughly 90% of the 13,000 employees were let go.  Still, despite shedding a 
substantial amount of “weight,” the IIIA remained functional under the new direction of 
William Benton, a former partner of the New York advertising agency Benton and 
Bowles.34  This new interim agency kept a number of the OWI’s previous functions, 
which included the Voice of America radio broadcasting service, education exchange 
programs, and cultural information centers, including libraries.  Along with the OWI 
libraries, three additional library collections were placed under the direction of the State 
Department.  These included the ALA’s libraries in Latin America; information centers 
in Austria, Japan, and Korea; and libraries in Amerika Häuser (“American Houses”).35  
The Amerika Häuser was part of the Allies “de-nazification” effort.  They served as small 
cultural institutions with libraries and lecture rooms available for use, along with classes 
that taught English.36  Had prior post-war planning not been fully considered while the 
war was still going on however, even these limited efforts may have fallen by the 
wayside. 
 In May 1942, Carl Milam contacted the State Department to “remind” them that 
there would have to be some type of post-war plan for maintaining cultural relations.  The 
State Department responded by proposing the ALA itself support these endeavors 
overseas by raising $10 to $50 million.  The ALA balked at this idea, seeing its role as 
one that would provide support and technical assistance, but not act as principal 
fundraiser.  Quite simply, the ALA did not believe it should bear the bulk of the financial 
responsibility for the cultural reconstruction of Europe.37
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 Following the war, a six-month mission was sent to Germany with the support of 
the Library of Congress (LC) and ALA.  The LC mission was given several tasks, which 
included gathering war-time publications from war-torn Europe, particularly Germany.  
The seven-member team included Harry Lydenberg, the 72 year old member of the 
ALA’s International Relations Board and former director of the New York Public 
Library.  The War Department viewed the main task of their mission to be the acquisition 
and duplication of Nazi war documents.  Lydenberg, however, was more concerned with 
acquiring books and materials for American libraries back home.  This included stored 
wartime publications and copies of all books published in Europe during the war.38
 Members of the mission expected to find Europe’s cultural institutions in disarray, 
but nothing could prepare Lydenberg and Milam for the actual conditions they would 
encounter.  They were horrified by just how great the devastation of Germany’s libraries 
was.  Those collections that weren’t destroyed by bombings had their collection 
development severely hindered by the Nazi’s ironfisted control of book purchasing.  All 
orders had to be cleared by the Gestapo headquarters in Berlin, which naturally limited 
the type and number of purchases that could be made.39
 Once in Germany, Lydenberg worked with the US Office of Military Government 
(OMGUS), the primary military organization responsible for overseeing the capturing of 
Nazi documents in the American Zone of post-war reconstruction.  It was during this 
time that relations between the ALA and the US government became slightly heated.  
The controversy primarily involved the disposal of pro-Nazi propaganda materials.  On 
13 May 1946 the four occupying powers had signed Order No. 4, which called for the 
destruction of “any literature of a national socialist or militarist nature.”  All libraries, 
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bookstores, and publishing houses were instructed to hand over these materials.  Included 
among the items to be destroyed was a list of 1,000 book titles and 35 periodicals.  Not 
surprisingly, there was intense opposition among librarians and academics alike.  Among 
the official orders for disposal of these titles was burning, an act that set off many 
librarians’ alarms.  After some protest, but not necessarily because of it, the instructions 
were revised so that at least 150 copies of each questionable item would be preserved “in 
the interests of research and scholarship.”  Despite some difficulty in procuring 
documents from Soviet occupied territories, by the end of the LC Mission 500,000 
separate Nazi documents had been shipped back to the US.  In addition, over 800,000 
volumes of “the most significant literature published in Europe during the war years” 
were collected for American libraries back home.  In the end, the mission was considered 
an overwhelming success, having fulfilled its duty of evaluating the impact of war on 
cultural institutions abroad during what Truman designated to “an emergency 
situation.”40  If there was one thing that was clear from the LC Mission, it was that the 
use of libraries was still firmly within the United States’ foreign policy plans.  
Increasingly, however, as the ALA worked to keep these libraries largely apolitical 
institutions, the State Department was attempting to mold these libraries to project a 
certain American point-of-view of the world.41   
Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 and Overseas Propaganda 
 Through the leadership of Executive Secretary Carl Milam, the ALA had made it 
clear that it wished to see these overseas institutions remain apolitical by refraining from 
advocating a specific “pro-American” bias in its collections.42  This view, however, did 
not coincide with the Truman administration’s plan for post-war relations abroad.  On 31 
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December 1946, the Interim International Information Agency that had been established 
by executive order the previous year was replaced by the Office of International 
Information and Cultural Affairs, keeping these activities under the control of the State 
Department.  Its necessity, according to Truman, was derived from the fact that “present 
day foreign relations” made it “essential for the United States to maintain informational 
activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs.”  No longer 
would these international information programs be focused on cultural exchange, as had 
previously been the case.  Advocating American interests abroad would be first and 
foremost on the list of priorities.  Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, who had 
previously headed the interim agency, was selected to head the new office.  He further 
echoed Truman’s earlier remarks, stating that “All programs in the field of so-called 
‘cultural relations’ should be designed to support US foreign policy in its long-range 
sense, and to serve as an arm of that policy.”43
 Still, opposition to keeping this arm of the State Department up and running 
persisted.  These feelings however, which were espoused by both Conservative 
Republicans and Democrats, began to subside as the issue of Soviet-sponsored 
propaganda became a more pressing concern among anti-communists in Washington.  In 
an action that went against the dominant party line opposing international institutions, a 
Republican Representative from South Dakota, Karl Mundt, introduced legislation that 
would lead to Congressional authorization for a permanent overseas information 
organization.  Mundt had been known to support international educational efforts in the 
past, but his outlook on this subject now was largely influenced by his own intense 
loathing and distrust of communism and communist sympathizers.44
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 Introduced in May 1947 and co-sponsored by Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-
NJ), the initial legislation that would later become the Smith Mundt Act of 1948 (H.R. 
3342) faced an uphill battle in both houses.  Mundt chaired the subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs which discussed the bill.  Consisting of three 
Democrats and three Republicans, the subcommittee favorably sent the bill to the House 
floor where it was passed 272-97.  Mundt had been able to secure over half of the 
Republican vote, having assured his skeptical anti-Communist colleagues that “no 
Communists or parlor pinks or crypto-Communists or fellow travelers would have any 
part of this program in any way, shape or form.”  However, once in the Senate the bill hit 
a wall of Republican opposition and was blocked before it could come to a vote before 
the end of Congress’s first session.45   
 The lack of support in the Senate prompted Mundt to lead a Congressional 
investigation of the overseas information activities.  The bipartisan investigation in 1947 
was a five week trip abroad lasting from September to October.  It consisted of twelve 
Senators and Representatives of a bipartisan nature and involved visits to twenty-two 
countries.  This investigation proved to be a tremendous boost to Mundt’s legislation, as 
it highlighted the Soviet’s “aggressive psychological warfare against us [United States] in 
order to discredit and drive us out of Europe.”  Additionally, the debate surrounding the 
State Department’s overseas information programs suddenly became connected to the 
overall recovery efforts in Europe associated with the Marshall Plan, still in the planning 
stages.  This association greatly aided the bill’s proponents.  Eventually, enough support 
was garnered in the Senate, and in early January 1948 the Smith-Mundt Act (officially 
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known as the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948) passed 
unanimously.  It was signed by Truman on 30 January, becoming Public Law 402.46
ALA and the Smith-Mundt Act 
 As stated previously, the ALA was firmly in favor of an overseas information 
program that promoted cultural exchange, not overt American propaganda.  Despite fears 
that the new legislation would cause this very thing to occur, the ALA supported the 
passage of the Smith-Mundt Act.  With its passage, however, many in Congress became 
more vocal in advocating the use of these institutions as tools for the very thing the ALA 
opposed.  Carl Milam and the ALA became greatly concerned that this would happen 
when they received word in 1947 that the State Department wished to use the overseas 
libraries to promote the Marshall Plan.  In late 1947, the ALA sent a critique of the 
overseas libraries to Secretary of State Marshall.  They urged the State Department to 
honor the original objectives of the international cultural programs by offering “a broad, 
honest, and non-propagandistic interpretation of US life and thought.”  Its conclusions, 
however, were perhaps counterproductive as they gave the State Department more 
incentive to continue down the path of direct propaganda.  In their critique, the ALA 
described the overseas information programs as being the most effective and least 
expensive form of media of all State Department cultural programs.  Not wishing to see 
the overseas libraries, and thus foreign perceptions of American librarianship, become 
associated abroad with one particular American point-of-view, Milam pushed to have 
cultural and informational activities separated from one another.  While his 
recommendation initially fell on deaf ears in Washington, after much effort Congress 
eventually acknowledged within the final Smith-Mundt bill that there was a fundamental 
 25
difference between informational and cultural activities.  Despite this acknowledgement, 
by the time Smith-Mundt became law the ALA had very little influence over policies 
controlling these libraries.47  As a result, the ALA’s concerns over the use of libraries 
abroad for propaganda quickly became a reality.   
 
Refashioning “Propaganda” 
 Despite the growing concern over Soviet-sponsored propaganda, there was still a 
significant amount of apprehension when it came to supporting overt propaganda efforts 
at home.  As a result, the Truman administration began to refashion the meaning and 
perception of US propaganda, in order to build support for increased efforts abroad.  One 
of the key components to this objective was to differentiate between types of propaganda.  
A 1944 War Department publication (part of the G.I. Roundtable Series) titled “What Is 
Propaganda?” had laid out the difference between “good” and “bad” propaganda.  “In the 
struggle for men’s minds that is constantly being waged by propagandists there is…a 
fundamental difference between the propaganda of dictatorship and the propaganda of 
democracy.”  According to this pamphlet, the essential difference between the two could 
be boiled down to one crucial “fact”: democratic propaganda contains the “truth” while 
propaganda like that of the Nazis suppressed the truth from the people.  Furthermore, it 
held that the “promotion of a worth-while cause is good propaganda.”48  As the Cold War 
began to heat up, and as the Truman administration began to promote a revamped 
propaganda effort abroad, promoting it this view of propaganda would become crucial in 
the effort to gain Congressional and public support for their efforts.  During the debates 
over the Smith-Mundt Act, Mundt and Assistant Secretary of State Benton insisted that 
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the US would not engage in deceitful activities.49   As a result, it became necessary to 
distinguish between “good” and “bad” propaganda in order to overshadow accusations of 
compromising the American tradition of a “free press” overseas. 
 The refashioning of propaganda as good vs. bad boiled down to propaganda that 
attempted to portray a “mirror” of society as opposed to one that merely “showcased” a 
society’s positive aspects.  Soviet propaganda was portrayed as deceitful, since it only 
reportedly told the positive aspects of communisms.  Conversely, American propaganda 
was deemed a “mirror” in that it offered a “true” picture of American society.  However, 
even this designation did not sit well with some government officials, who were 
concerned that a completely honest depiction of American society (involving such things 
as racism and worker’s rights) could damage America’s overall image overseas.  As a 
result, America’s “good” propaganda was simply deemed to be the “truth” while the 
Soviet’s were depicted as spreading nothing but lies.  In reality, as with any effective 
propaganda program, the US worked diligently to “showcase” the positives of society 
under the guise of being completely truthful in its attempt to mirror American society.  
Nevertheless, it was assumed that the truth emanating from the US would ultimately 
convince the foreign public that America was the superior nation in this new “war of 
words,” thus causing free citizens to reject the false hopes espoused by communism.50   
 Simply redefining America’s propaganda activities, however, would not be 
enough to suppress all criticism of the Truman administration’s overseas information 
plans.  Kenneth McKellar, Democratic Senator from Tennessee, questioned the necessity 
of a propaganda program during a Senate Appropriations Committee meeting: “What 
does it [propaganda] do?  What does it accomplish? … I don’t believe you have ever 
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influenced a single individual.”51 Others decried its use overseas because it created, in the 
words of Rep. Katherine St. George (R-NY), feelings of resentment around the world as a 
result of various luxuries in the US being highlighted.52  Others, such as Rep. George 
Meader (R-MI) questioned the effectiveness of propaganda by wondering whether the 
US’s interests could be better served through actions rather than words.53
 By 1950, despite these differences of opinion coming largely from the opposite 
side of the political aisle, Truman made a concerted effort to increase these propaganda 
efforts.  Overseas, the Soviets had already launched their own propaganda offensive 
against the US, dubbed the “Hate America” initiative.  In this campaign, the Soviet Union 
stressed its own desire for “peaceful coexistence” with all countries.  At the same time, 
they portrayed the US as the real Cold War aggressors.  As a result, the Truman 
administration was willing to take political flack from its opponents in order to counter 
this image.54  Dubbed the “Campaign of Truth,” the new propaganda plan was publicly 
launched during a speech by Truman to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 
April 1950.  In order to counter the Soviet’s propaganda, the US would coordinate 
overseas information activities with other free nations “in a sustained, intensified 
program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery.”  Again, the 
justification was based on the oft heard notion that simply disseminating the “truth” 
would discredit the Soviets and win support for the US throughout the world.55  When 
Truman announced this program, it garnered considerable praise, especially within 
America’s newspapers.  The New York Times called it “a task worthy of our best national 
efforts.”56
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 This new “Campaign of Truth” led to an increasingly militarized approach to 
overseas information dissemination.  As a result of this Campaign of Truth, the overseas 
information programs were being run completely counter to everything ALA officials 
had publicly fought for involving intellectual freedom.  However, there were a series of 
developments regarding the book collections that attempted to instill a more “open” feel 
within these libraries.  The government saw books as an ever more effective strategy to 
influence worldwide opinion.  According the recently created Psychological Strategy 
Board (PSB), books were “by far the most powerful means of influencing the attitude of 
intellectuals.”57  In addition to community leaders, the Campaign of Truth also began to 
specifically target other segments of the population that had traditionally not been the 
subject of direct propaganda, but who were believed to be more susceptible to the 
promises of Communist propaganda.  These included urban laborers, farm workers, and 
poorer white collar individuals.  With the new book collection policies, however, the 
State Department moved even further away from a well-rounded book collection and 
focused on books that advocated a specific anti-communist message.58
 New books that were collected for the information service program fell into three 
primary three categories: (1) books by former Russian citizens with connections to the 
Soviet government; (2) books by non-Russians who had previously joined the 
Communist party; (3) books by people living in the US but who possessed knowledge of 
Communism.  Of course, the most important stipulation ensured that all author were 
avowed anti-communists.  It was believed that authors who had lived under and been 
subjected to the Communist regime, and who had later rejected that form of government, 
would be much more effective at convincing susceptible nations that communism was an 
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outright evil.  Therefore, these books were purchased and placed within the overseas 
libraries, which by 1953 were attracting over 36 million visitors a year.59
 By 1952 the Republican Party had begun to advocate an even harder lined 
strategy with the Soviets, and rode a wave of aggressive anti-communism into the White 
House.  With the former WWII General Dwight Eisenhower now in the nation’s highest 
office, Republicans began to reclaim much of the political power Democrats had held for 
years.  In 1953, a junior Senator from Wisconsin named Joseph McCarthy assumed the 
position of chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, which 
included the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations.  While the Committee on 
Government Operations was often considered a minor, and rather dull, committee, the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations possessed a great deal of influence over the 
government’s policies and operations.  Using this authority, Senator McCarthy would 
begin his infamous campaign to rid the government of all communist and subversive 
elements, ultimately leading to his own discrediting and downfall.  Before that occurred, 
however, McCarthy would take aim at the overseas information programs.  The first 
target would be the Voice of America radio network, and following that McCarthy turned 
his sights on the overseas libraries.  Although the ALA had in recent years become 
greatly displeased with the developments within the overseas information programs, they 
would ultimately view this challenge as a threat to librarianship as a whole. 
 As the next chapter illustrates, libraries and librarians would figure heavily in 
upcoming Senate investigations in which intense criticism was leveled at these overseas 
programs.  Before addressing this confrontation, however, it is important to first 
demonstrate how the rising level of ALA opposition to censorship at home, set the ALA 
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up for a showdown against anti-communist crusaders within the US Congress.  Before 
the ALA could take on McCarthy, it had to develop a spine that would permit it to stand 
up and defend matters involving intellectual freedom. 
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III 
 
ALA and Intellectual Freedom Challenges Post-WWII 
 
 The political atmosphere in the United States following the Second World War 
was dominated by suspicion, distrust, and outright threats against all “communist” 
elements within the country.  With the anti-Communist hysteria that would come to 
define the McCarthy era just beginning to become ingrained within the American psyche, 
anyone and anything that even hinted of left-wing ideology could be construed as 
“communist (regardless of the actual political affiliation of the accused).  In reference to 
members of the Communist party, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. 
Edgar Hoover stated: “They want civil license to do as they please, and if they get 
control, liberty for Americans will be but a haunted memory.”60  It was within this 
atmosphere that librarians found themselves operating after WWII, and this environment 
would provide fertile ground for censorship proponents to launch a series of increasingly 
virulent challenges to intellectual freedom in libraries.  
 In 1944, Leon Carnovsky replaced Forrest Spaulding as head of the Intellectual 
Freedom Committee.  Despite making some important advances in publicizing 
intellectual freedom challenges, Carnovsky believed that such public statements were of 
little benefit without the full cooperation of librarians around the country.61  Again, he 
was of the mindset that the words Library Bill of Rights should be reflected in the actions 
of librarians.  Referring to reluctant librarians in a speech, Carnovsky said they 
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practically “do not accept it (Library Bill of Rights, IFC statements, etc) when they 
submit, either willingly or under protest, to pressures of whatever sort which result in 
denial of freedom of inquiry to the library user.”62  Carnovsky also became frustrated by 
a lack of censorship reporting among librarians.  Writing in the ALA Bulletin in October 
1945, Carnovsky stated: 
The lack of information about such incidents may mean that they do not exist—
that librarians are generally free from interference in their book selection 
practices.  On the other hand, it may mean that librarians do not care to report 
interference.  Or, finally, it may mean that librarians are so cautious in policies of 
book selection that they avoid “incidents” before they have a chance to occur.  
Whatever the meaning, the fact remains that the committee has received very little 
indication of interference with the freedom to read in libraries.63   
 
The next year, in 1946, a mere four cases were reported.64
 
 Carnovsky’s tenure as IFC chair ended in the summer of 1945, when he was 
replaced by Alice G. Higgins.  Higgins continued to push for a more active role by the 
IFC, and under her leadership the IFC became increasingly outspoken.  Like her 
predecessor, Higgins felt the Library Bill of Rights of 1939 had failed to make much of 
an impression on librarians as a whole.  To help remedy this situation, she continually 
pressed the issue and urged the rest of the librarian profession to join the IFC in devoting 
more attention to acts of censorship in libraries.65   
 By 1947, others began to join her.  The library literature at the time reflected a 
growing concern among librarians that censorship issues were not being dealt with in an 
effective manner.  However, some librarians took steps to put out the fire before it even 
began.  In Massachusetts for instance, Hiller C. Wellman pressed for self-censorship by 
authors and publishers in order to preemptively suppress a public outcry against certain 
books.  His reasoning involved an understandable desire “to avoid the increase in legal 
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censorship” and “to emphasize the importance of decency and good taste,” but it also 
precisely reflected Carnovsky’s criticism in 1945.  In essence, Wellman was saying 
“don’t write bad stuff, and librarians won’t be forced to censor it” (not his words).  
Flawed as his reasoning was may have been (for in truth he was simply adopting the role 
of the “all-knowing” censor and putting a slightly nicer face on it), he had the support of 
many librarians behind him.  The Massachusetts Library Association (MLA) even 
adopted a version of Wellman’s statement.66  The MLA statement reflected a growing 
trend among the profession.  Censorship was clearly becoming a hotter topic of 
discussion among librarians, it was not going to simply disappear, librarians wanted a 
practical way to deal with the issue, and the ALA still lacked a clear and committed 
policy regarding the issue.  The 1939 Library Bill of Rights and the creation of the IFC 
were important steps, but they still lacked a certain authority to backup statements against 
censorship.  Things were changing however, and by 1948, the time would be ripe to 
seriously reexamine the issue and establish a profession-wide consensus on dealing with 
it. 
Revising the ALA’s Stance on Intellectual Freedom 
 In early 1948, Higgins wrote Milam to criticize the IFC midwinter report for 
being “so weak and routine.”  Librarians, she felt, were “not yet ready to adopt a 
resolution which will have deep meaning for the profession and influence its practices.”   
She felt the original Library Bill of Rights had “failed to make an impression upon 
librarians.”  Librarians had to be made more aware “of how vital the maintenance of civil 
liberties is to them professionally.”  Higgins urged the ALA to take up the issue at the 
next annual conference.  However, she did not wish to simply repeat the process of 1939.  
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There had to be a deeper change among librarians as a whole before the profession could 
be expected to stand united against unjust censorship efforts.  Education was a key 
component to her plan, as she believed that neither the ALA nor the professional library 
schools had devoted enough time stressing the importance of intellectual freedom.  
Furthermore, as Louise Robbins points out, librarians were also American citizens who 
could easily be caught up in the growing Cold War paranoia, preferring a sense of 
security over one’s own civil liberties.67  
 Before the Midwinter Conference, however, Higgins resigned from her position, 
citing personal reasons involving time and money.  Replacing her was David K. 
Berninghausen, a man who had developed a firm commitment to intellectual freedom 
dating back to his education at the Columbia University School of Library Service. 
Berninghausen had briefly studied under Helen E. Haines, an early advocate and defender 
of intellectual freedom.  She was responsible for having organized the California 
Intellectual Freedom Committee and was behind the fight of California’s ban of Building 
America, a social studies textbook that had been labeled “un-American.”  Haines had 
been an early critic of the Library Bill of Rights, believing the ALA could and should do 
more to uphold the principles of intellectual freedom, and was extremely critical of the 
federal government’s attempts to censor communist and other un-American texts.  This 
influence on Berninghausen would help guide the IFC and the ALA through several 
upcoming storms and cause the organization to refocus its mission as stated in the 
original Library Bill of Rights.68
  Under the new leadership of Berninghausen, the IFC was further poised to take on 
censorship challenges.  Others were speaking up as well.  In an ALA Bulletin guest 
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editorial, Ralph Ellsworth urged librarians to resist outside efforts to control the content 
within libraries.  “Assaults on intellectual freedom,” he stated, “…are as old as man.”  
The current situation involving fear of subversive Communist elements was merely the 
latest example in a long line of abuses that often occurred “when man is about to take 
some new forward looking step in self-improvement or after some new idea has disturbed 
man’s habitual complacency.”  In a statement that certainly should have made Higgins 
proud, he equated the public library tradition with the democratic heritage handed down 
by the founding fathers.  “We can and should resist, individually and collectively through 
the ALA by means of public statements, the pressure of those who say you may not buy 
this, you must destroy this, you may not circulate this, all interpreted in light of sound 
professional experience,” he continued.  However, the fight for intellectual freedom, he 
argued, should not be limited to libraries.  He urged librarians to take up the cause 
universally and not wait for censorship attacks to hit their own library.  “I hope we will 
not stand like chickens, waiting for our turn on the block.”69
 Berninghausen echoed these sentiments in a May ALA Bulletin editorial in which 
he contended that free inquiry is an essential aspect of any free society.  “In a democracy 
this responsibility for critical thinking, especially about one’s own government, is a 
fundamental necessity,” he wrote.  Berninghausen declared that librarians had three 
choices of action they could take regarding attempts to limit intellectual freedom.  They 
could sit out and hope for the best, they could personally write their Congressmen and 
President and hope their voice would be heard, or they could take action themselves and 
make the issue the prominent focus of the upcoming annual conference in Atlantic City, 
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Berninghausen urged the latter, thus setting the stage for what would become an 
extremely important conference in the ALA’s history. 70  
1948 Atlantic City Conference and the Library Bill of Rights 
 As one might suspect based on the increasingly outspokenness of librarians 
against censorship, the IFC dominated the overall agenda of the 1948 Annual 
Conference.  Overall, the committee brought three items before the ALA council to 
discuss: (1) a revision of the Library Bill of Rights; (2) the creation of state committees to 
monitor and investigate censorship activities; (3) and a resolution protesting the Loyalty 
Oath programs.71   
 On June 15, during the Second General Session of the conference, Robert D. 
Leigh gave a speech in which he argued that the librarian profession should not allow 
individual “martyrs” to confront “pressure-group censorship” but should act as a whole to 
confront the problem.  In his speech, he stated: 
The more prudent tradition is the one I observe in my visits – of bowing quickly 
to pressures, and of retiring questionable books to the inner sanctum of the 
librarian’s office, where they remain, to save the librarian’s conscience against 
burning them, and to avoid any trouble.  What I suggest for consideration is not 
lonely individual heroism, but the development of group policy, solidarity, and 
action in this matter of resisting improper pressures.72
 
It was with this line of thinking that Berninghausen urged the ALA council to revise the 
original Library Bill of Rights to “clearly place libraries in the position of being 
aggressive defenders of the right to freedom of research and inquiry.”  The decision to do 
so required little discussion by the ALA Council, having already heard numerous 
arguments in favor of doing so.  As a result, it passed easily.73
 There were several prominent changes in the 1948 revision.  Article I, which 
addressed the issue of material selection, was prefaced with an opening phrase that stated, 
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“As a responsibility of library service,” a move that helped link the issue of intellectual 
freedom with the process of selecting materials and emphasized the responsibility of all 
librarians to do so.  Furthermore, the 1939 reference regarding the use of public funds for 
the purchase of library materials was deleted in order to include all materials in the 
library, not just those that were purchased for the collection.  Additionally, the 1939 
version stated that the selection process should not be influenced by the race, nationality, 
political, or religious views of an author.  In 1948, this became more explicit, stating that 
“in no case” whatsoever should materials be excluded based on these characteristics.74  
Most importantly, two entirely new articles were added to address the issue of censorship 
and the methods of challenging such efforts.  Article III stated, “Censorship of 
books…must be challenged by libraries in maintenance of their responsibility to provide 
public information and enlightenment through the printed word.”  Article IV urged “the 
cooperation of allied groups in the fields of science, of education, and of book publishing 
in resisting all abridgement of the free access to ideas and full freedom of expression….”  
 Opposition to this new version was nonexistent among the members of the ALA 
Council, who proceeded to adopt the revisions on June 18.75  With the 1948 Library Bill 
of Rights, the ALA had finally addressed the numerous concerns that had been espoused 
by numerous librarians and intellectual freedom advocates since the original Library Bill 
of Rights in 1939.  This move garnered national attention and was praised across the 
nation.  The New York Times printed the revised Library Bill of Rights in its entirety and 
the New York Herald Tribune praised the ALA’s “courageous leadership in resisting the 
negation and futility of censorship” while urging others to follow in the ALA’s 
footsteps.76
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 However, as with the 1939 Library Bill of Rights, the revised version was 
determined to be an ineffective piece of paper without some form of organizational 
enforcement to back it up.  As a result, the IFC called for the creation of state committees 
to monitor and investigate incidents of censorship.  However, getting these individual 
state associations to create these committees proved to be rather difficult.  By March 
1949, only twenty-eight states committees were formed (including the District of 
Columbia).77  Nevertheless, the new bill of rights marked a dramatic step for the ALA in 
its effort to promote and defend intellectual freedom. 
The Nation Public School Banning 
 Following the adoption of the 1948 Library Bill of Rights, there were several 
immediate challenges to the ALA’s stance on intellectual freedom.  One of these 
challenges which garnered a good bit of press within the library literature and the national 
media at the time involved The Nation, a politically focused journal of opinion that was 
consistently aligned to the left of the political spectrum.  This description alone was 
enough to cause the Nation to be viewed with suspicion, but when a series of articles by 
Paul Blanshard were deemed to be anti-Catholic, the New York City Board of Education 
banned the publication from all NYC public schools.  The reasoning for doing so was laid 
out by William Jansen, Superintendent of Schools.  In an issued statement, Jansen 
declared, “If a magazine has an objectionable article, that one issue is not circulated in 
the schools; if a series of articles are objectionable, the magazine is no longer ordered.”  
The previous January, Newark, NJ public schools had already taken action by banning 
the publication from its schools for similar reasons.  The decision to do so was 
immediately protested by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Public Education 
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Association, the United Parents Associations, and the American Jewish Congress.78  The 
ALA would soon join them. 
 Berninghausen and ALA President E. W. McDiarmid debated about how the IFC 
should respond.  On 13 July 1948, Berninghausen attended a hearing on the matter that 
was held in the school superintendent’s office.  Berninghausen adamantly opposed the 
ban, stating that such a ban was “a threat to the right to disseminate information…”  Later 
that fall, ALA Interim Executive Secretary Harold Brigham summarized the ALA’s 
stance on the issue with the following statement:  “We protest the ban of the Nation from 
the libraries of the New York City schools as an act that is a threat to the freedom of 
expression and contrary to the Library Bill of Rights and the United States Bill of Rights.  
We hope that the ban will be lifted.”  Despite these efforts by the ALA and others to lift 
the ban, the New York City school system stood its ground.  In fact, the Nation remained 
on the list of banned publications until 1957.  Nevertheless, despite its lack of success, 
the Nation incident proved to be a good test case to see how the ALA would respond to 
censorship challenges by aligning itself with other organizations in support of intellectual 
freedom.  This incident would help lay the groundwork for future incidents in the near 
future and further contributed to the ALA’s resolve to confront public censors.79
Opposition to Loyalty Oaths 
 Around the same time that idea of intellectual freedom was solidifying itself as a 
cornerstone of the ALA’s philosophy, leading up to the 1948 Annual Conference, 
President Truman provided another issue that forced the ALA to respond.  On March 21, 
1947, Truman issued Executive Order 9835.  This executive order was designed to ensure 
the loyalty of all federal executive employees to the United States and its system of 
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government; however it soon began to be applied in other areas of the government such 
as the Library of Congress, and eventually found its way into the realm of public 
librarianship.80
 Although the Library of Congress (LC) was not initially required to participate in 
the Loyalty Oath program, it did so largely out of fear of drawing the ire of suspicious 
Congressmen and being consequently being accused of harboring Communists.  Many 
Republicans had been suspicious of the LC during Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency 
because the Librarian of Congress, Archibald MacLeish, had been an ardent supporter of 
Roosevelt and the New Deal programs.  Conservatives also viewed the LC as a potential 
haven for Communist infiltrators.  As a result, current Librarian of Congress Luther 
Evans took steps to quell these accusations by voluntarily submitting to the loyalty check 
program.81
 The Library of Congress’s decision drew intense criticism from the ALA, which 
expressed grave concerns that such loyalty checks could later be applied to other 
institutions not affiliated with the federal government.  Fears surrounding the 
implications for public librarians were realized in August 1947 in Los Angeles with 
creation of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors’ Loyalty Check Committee.  
The L.A. County Public Library fell under its jurisdiction, and as a result public librarians 
were subjected to a loyalty oath.  The employee loyalty check included swearing that 
they had never “been a member of, or directly or indirectly supported” any organization 
on a list of 141 organizations.  The library’s director, John Henderson, did not force his 
employees to submit to the check, and when the oath was submitted to all county 
employees in February 1948, 19 librarians refused to sign it.  The Los Angeles County 
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Board of Supervisors was not pleased with this action, and it led the board to investigate 
Henderson personally.  He later accused of harboring, in the word of one commissioner, 
“liberal thoughts that we don’t like in the mid of the head of our library,” which resulted 
in a serious threat to his employment.82  These actions helped attract the attention of the 
ALA and IFC, and they contributed to the third item of discussion (loyalty oaths) before 
the ALA Council at the 1948 Annual Conference.83   
 The loyalty oath issue did not attract as strong support as the Library Bill of 
Rights however.  Many librarians feared that if the ALA publicly opposed such measures, 
the organization itself would be added to the list of subversive organizations.  Despite 
these differences in opinion, however, the loyalty oath resolution passed 32 to 23.  The 
issue, however, was far from over.  Berninghausen in particular was concerned that the 
resolution’s wording severely weakened the IFC’s position to oppose these checks.   The 
wording of the initial resolution read: “The Council of the American Library 
Association…record[s] its unqualified condemnation of the abuse of loyalty 
investigations in libraries…”  Berninghausen felt this wording could lead to great 
confusion, since those who initiated such investigations rarely viewed their own behavior 
as an “abuse.”  As a result, this wording was changed at the 1949 Mid-winter conference 
to “use,” thus clarifying and strengthening the ALA’s own position.84
 Still, the issue did not go away.  Many librarians felt the ALA resolution had been 
hastily passed without full consideration of the circumstances surrounding the loyalty 
oaths.  As a result, the IFC was led to take the issue up again at the 1950 annual 
conference.  After considerable debate, the new resolution passed unanimously.  
Members of the council were able to reach a compromise which softened the initial 
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blanket condemnation of loyalty checks.85  The new resolution focused on specific 
aspects of the loyalty oaths, protesting those programs “which inquire into a library 
employee’s thoughts, reading matter, associates, or membership in organizations, unless a 
particular person’s definite actions warrant such investigation.”  In the event of a 
warranted investigation, the statement further condemned those “which permit the 
discharge of an individual without a fair hearing.”86  This final resolution proved to be an 
acceptable compromise between opposing sides, and it marked one more step by the 
ALA in its evolving fight to protect and preserve free thought within the library. 
Preparation for Future Challenges  
 The 1940s had certainly served as an extremely important decade for the ALA 
and the development of intellectual freedom.  By the decade’s close, the IFC had gained a 
considerable amount of influence on a national level, especially when compared to its 
initial standing before WWII.  For the most part the various challenges to intellectual 
freedom had helped galvanize the profession during confrontations with censorship 
proponents.  By 1950, intellectual freedom had clearly solidified itself as one of the 
profession’s defining principles.  Writing in the November 1949 ALA Bulletin, ALA 
President McDiarmid stated that American librarians must, “Stand firm and strong for 
intellectual freedom and devote our whole-hearted energies to its preservation.”  
McDiarmid cautioned librarians to not be shortsighted by keeping their focus within 
American libraries.   
Intellectual freedom is one of those intangible objectives that some might criticize 
as being impractical and of little immediate value to libraries and librarianship.  
Perhaps this is true or perhaps some people cannot see how fundamental it is to 
librarianship.  We must face that problem and try to meet it as best we can, but we 
must not permit any such feelings to make us waver for one moment in our 
vigorous support of intellectual freedom throughout the world.” 
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The next decade would bring such challenges to intellectual freedom literally “throughout 
the world.”  The Cold War was still in its initial phases, and as a result the anti-
communist fervor that had begun to sweep the nation after WWII continued to be an 
increasingly pervasive issue that would continue to affect the ALA in its defense of 
intellectual freedom. 
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IV 
 
McCarthy, the ALA, and the  
Investigation of Overseas Libraries 
 Before Edward R. Murrow’s landmark See It Now documentary aired on CBS in 
1954, attacking,87 before Army attorney general Joseph Welch’s infamous retort during 
the 1954 Army-McCarthy Hearings (“Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? 
Have you left no sense of decency?”),88 and before the mainstream press in general began 
to seriously question the motives behind ‘McCarthyism,’ the American Library 
Association was on the front lines defending intellectual freedom in the heat of the 
McCarthy era.  Although the ALA was adamantly opposed to the explicit propaganda 
activities that had been transferred to the overseas libraries, the organization had come to 
accept the importance of creating “a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims 
and policies of the United States government,” in the words of Truman.89  Under 
Truman’s “Campaign of Truth,” it became official policy of the overseas libraries to 
collect books that made attempts to create a balanced book collection, including the 
words of known Communist authors (many of whom had recanted their Communist 
beliefs and were staunch anti-Communists).  However, in 1953, with a new Republican in 
the White House and a Republican controlled Senate, Senator Joseph McCarthy was 
presented with an opportunity few ardent anti-Communists could refuse.  Since 1950 
McCarthy had been going after the so-called Communist infiltration of the State 
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Department.  When he became head of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, he was suddenly thrust into a position of importance which he would 
immediately begin to use to “out” all Communists and Communist sympathizers, as well 
as for his own personal media exposure.   
The Investigations Begin 
 Before McCarthy began his series of hearings in February 1953, there had already 
been serious debate within Congress and the State Department over the future of these 
programs.  Newly appointed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wanted the 
information programs completely removed from the State Department, a sentiment that 
was later echoed by Iowa Republican Bourke Hickenlooper in a Senate Investigation on 
the subject.  Conversely, a separate White House investigation led by Abbot Washburn 
and Henry Loomis proposed the opposite, which would keep the IIA under the State 
Department while giving the program independent bureaucratic status.  Before a decision 
could be arrived at, however, McCarthy’s investigation of these operations caused the 
programs to grind to a virtual halt and threatened their very existence.90
 McCarthy began investigating the overseas information programs largely out a 
desire to attract national media attention to his anti-Communist endeavors.91  These 
hearings offered the Senator his first opportunity to appear publicly on television on a 
regular basis.92  McCarthy would begin his subcommittee investigations by targeting the 
Voice of America radio program, and from this investigation McCarthy would soon shift 
his focus to the overseas libraries’ book collections. 
 Early on, McCarthy relied on insider information from a group of “friends” within 
the International Information Agency (IIA).  Calling themselves the “Loyal American 
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Underground,” these inside informants were largely guided by their own zealous anti-
Communist sentiments.  On 3 February, in response to the pressure from this 
investigation, the State Department issued an internal revision of its book collection 
policy that had been in effect since the beginning of the Campaign of Truth.  Authored by 
several prominent individuals within the library profession, including 1953 ALA 
President Robert B. Downs and Harvard Libraries director Keyes Metcalf, this new 
directive stated: 
The reputation of an author affects the active utility of the material. If he is widely 
and favorably known abroad as a champion of democratic causes, his creditability 
and utility may be enhanced.  Similarly, if – like Howard Fast – he is known as a 
Soviet-endorsed author, materials favorable to the United States in some of his 
works may thereby be given a special creditability among selected key 
audiences.93  
 
Many individuals, of course, felt that any sense of balance in the libraries’ collections 
was an automatic capitulation to the Communists.  The directive was promptly leaked to 
McCarthy, who then went on national television to lambaste the State Department for its 
decision to include “subversive” books overseas.  As a result of this directive, Howard 
Fast was called before the subcommittee to testify on 18 February.  During Fast’s 
testimony McCarthy repeatedly berated the author, and Fast refused to answer many of 
McCarthy’s questions by pleading the Fifth Amendment (an act that would continually 
repeat itself with future witnesses).94   
 As a result of Fast’s appearance before the Subcommittee, the State Department 
issued a new directive titled “Information Guide 272.”  This new directive banned all 
book, music, and paintings by “controversial persons, Communists, fellow travelers, et 
cetera” from all overseas information centers and ordered the immediate removal of all 
publications that fit this description.  A subsequent investigation of the libraries’ book 
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collections led to a charge that 30,000 “Communist” volumes were present overseas, a 
number that had been drawn from individual titles from 418 authors.95  This vague 
directive set off a sea of confusion within the libraries overseas.  Chaos ensued as 
librarians were forced to decide what constituted a “controversial person,” who a “fellow 
traveler” was, and what “et cetera” meant with very little guidance from lawmakers in 
Washington, D.C.  While some librarians reacted slowly at first, waiting for a 
clarification of the terms before they attempted to make a practical policy, others acted 
with hastiness and indiscretion.  Usually volumes that were removed were placed in 
storage to await further instruction, but in several instances books were actually burned.  
Although there were only eleven titles destroyed in manner, the incidents caused a public 
outcry back in the States.96  In early April, chief counsel Roy Cohn and subcommittee 
consultant David Schine embarked on a seventeen day trip across Europe to assess the 
progress being made in ridding the libraries of Communist materials.  Their presence 
disturbed many librarians and overseas staff members and generated a great deal of 
negative press overseas.  As Cohn and Schine entered one site, a librarian reportedly 
pocketed a Dashiell Hammett as they went about their inspection.97  Librarians had 
certainly grown overly paranoid as a result of this investigation, but they would soon find 
a more focused and committed to protecting intellectual freedom overseas. 
The Westchester Conference and The Freedom to Read  
 As the Subcommittee’s focus shifted from the Voice of America to the overseas 
libraries hearings, which began 24 March and continued for the next four months, the 
ALA and IFC began to consider how to respond.  Prior to McCarthy’s investigations, IFC 
Chairman William S. Dix had called for an “off-the-record” conference to “give some 
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guidance to librarians in defending their basic principles.”  Dix believed the country was 
headed down the wrong path regarding intellectual freedom, so he pushed for a 
conference that would help incite librarians to stand up.  He foresaw challenges arising in 
the near future, and warned of an “era of book burning such as we have never seen 
before.”   The IFC contacted the American Book Publishers Council (ABPC), and a 
conference was arranged to take place May 2 and 3 at the Westchester Country Club in 
Rye, New York.  Over the course of these two days, a group of twenty-five librarians, 
publishers, and citizens met, and from these meetings emerged a document that would 
become known as The Freedom to Read.98  Later in May, as repeated witnesses 
continued to refuse to answer McCarthy’s questions based on their Fifth Amendment 
rights, it was discovered that a directive to the overseas libraries had ordered the removal 
of all works by any author or individual who refused to testify.  This only furthered the 
urgency under which The Freedom to Read was first composed and then distributed.99
 The effect of the McCarthy investigations could immediately be felt with The 
Freedom to Read’s opening statement: “The freedom to read is essential to our 
democracy.  It is under attack.”  Within the statement, however, was recognition of 
current attempts to pressure and influence films, TV, the radio, and the press.  “The 
problem is not only one of actual censorship,” the statement read.  “The shadow of fear 
cast by these pressure leads, we suspect, to an even larger voluntary curtailment of 
expression by those who seek to avoid controversy.”  The statement concluded with 
seven propositions to affirm a commitment to intellectual freedom by librarians and 
publishers: 
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(1) It is in the public interest for publishers and librarians to make available the 
widest diversity of views and expressions, including those which are 
unorthodox or unpopular with the majority. 
 
(2) Publishers and librarians do not need to endorse every idea or presentation 
contained in the books they make available.  It would conflict with the public 
interest for them to establish their own political, moral or aesthetic views as 
the sole standard for determining what books should be published or 
circulated. 
 
(3) It is contratry to the public interest for publishers or librarians to determine the 
acceptability of a book solely on the basis of the personal history or political 
affiliations of the author. 
 
(4) The present laws dealing with obscenity should be vigorously enforced.  
Beyond that, there is no place in our society for extra-legal efforts to coerce 
the taste of others, to confine adults to the reading matter deemed suitable for 
adolescents, or to inhibit the efforts of writers to achieve artistic expression. 
 
(5) It is not in the public interest to force a reader to accept with any book the 
prejudgment of a label characterizing the book or author as subversive or 
dangerous. 
 
(6) It is the responsibility of publishers and librarians, as guardians of the 
people’s freedom to read, to contest encroachments upon that freedom by 
individuals or groups seeking to impose their own standards or tastes upon the 
community at large. 
 
(7) It is the responsibility of publishers and librarians to give full meaning to the 
freedom to read by providing books that enrich the quality of thought and 
expression.  By the exercise of this affirmative responsibility, bookmen can 
demonstrate that the answer to a bad book is a good one, the answer to a bad 
ideas is a good one.100 
 
 After the Westchester Conference ended, Dan Lacy (who had recently left his 
position with the Library of Congress to join the ABPC) and IFC Chairman William Dix 
worked on refining the “Freedom to Read” statement for the upcoming ALA Annual 
Conference in Los Angeles.101  With the Westchester Conference coinciding with 
McCarthy’s hearings on the overseas information programs, the issue of intellectual 
freedom was as hot and relevant as it had ever been within the library profession.  As the 
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ALA was preparing to take the issue up in full force during its upcoming annual 
conference in late July, President Eisenhower caused a national stir in the press when he 
gave the commencement address at Dartmouth College.  During his speech, Eisenhower 
remarked: 
Don’t join the book burners…Don’t think you are going to conceal faults by 
concealing evidence that they ever existed.  Don’t be afraid to go in your library 
and read every book, as long as that document does not offend our own ideas of 
decency.  That should be the only censorship.  How will we defeat communism 
unless we know what it is, and what it teaches, and why does it have such an 
appeal for men, why are so many people swearing allegiance to it?102
 Eisenhower’s remarks initially set off a firestorm in the press.  Given the fact that 
they coincided with McCarthy’s investigation of overseas libraries, many took his words 
as a sign that Eisenhower (who had largely remained silent on the recent investigations) 
was attempting to criticize and distance himself from McCarthy.  President Eisenhower, 
however, was quick to clarify his remarks during a press conference three days later.  
During this press conference, Eisenhower made it clear that he was not as open to all 
books being in the overseas collections.  The subject remarks had primarily been focused 
on the issue of domestic censorship, something he adamantly opposed.  However, when it 
came to Communist books overseas, Eisenhower was quick to clarify that he did not 
support the dissemination of materials which advocated the overthrow of the American 
government and/or the destruction of America’s capitalist society.103  As discussion over 
Eisenhower’s remarks and subsequent partial retraction swirled around the country, the 
ALA prepared to meet for what would be an extremely important, and rather 
groundbreaking, annual conference in Los Angeles. 
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1953 ALA Conference, Freedom to Read, and the “Overseas Library Statement” 
 As the ALA was gathering in Los Angeles for its annual conference, the book 
collection controversy was still making national headlines.  With witnesses continuing to 
refuse to testify before McCarthy’s subcommittee, the list of banned books overseas grew 
to include sixteen additional authors who were banned as a result of these hearings.  
Authors included such individuals as Howard Fast, Earl Browder, Helen Goldfrank, 
Dashiell Hammett, and in some instances the works of Langston Hughes.  In late June the 
New York Times reported these actions and revealed the “clearing” process that books 
now had to go through if they were going to be included in the libraries abroad.  When it 
came out that Mark Twain’s works had to be cleared before they could be circulated 
overseas, it highlighted the rather excessive hysteria over subversive titles that was now 
controlling book selection process.104
 The ALA conference convened on June 21 in Los Angeles.  On the 22nd, newly 
appointed ALA President Robert B. Downs gave the presidential “stocktaking” address.  
Downs opened his address with an attack on ‘McCarthyism’.  Describing it as a “virulent 
disease,” Downs warned his audience that the current book hysteria, which was 
threatening the very foundations of the profession, was also “infecting nearly every 
segment of our governmental structure from nation down to local levels…Stringent 
censorship directives, issued in the atmosphere of fear, hysteria, and repression now 
prevailing in Washington, threaten to place the entire information library program in 
jeopardy.”  As a result, he called on every ALA member, all 21,000, to “stand firm” in 
the face of these challenges.105  Following Downs’s speech, The Freedom to Read 
statement was distributed the ALA members and council for its official adoption.  
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Proponents of the statement had little to fear during this conference, for The Freedom to 
Read was adopted “overwhelmingly by a shouting and enthusiastic vote” on June 25th. 
 The 25th also saw the adoption of the ALA’s “Overseas Library Statement.”  
While the federal government had for years now been attempting distance the principles 
of American librarianship from those being employed overseas, the ALA continued to 
view the overseas libraries controversy from the perspective of American librarianship.  
Since the end of WWII the ALA had increasingly fought for the intellectual and cultural 
exchange in these libraries, and this line of thought continued in full force throughout the 
ALA conference.106   Largely composed by Dan Lacy, the “Overseas Library Statement” 
was the culmination of events that had been leading up to the conference.  The statement 
began by declaring, “The American Library Association has been intimately associated 
with the overseas library program of the United States Government from its initiation.”  
The statement acknowledged the importance of libraries overseas as “effective 
weapons…in the battle to preserve free men and free minds from the enslavement of the 
Communist political and intellectual tyranny.”  However, the statement stressed that the 
effectiveness of these programs “depended on the conviction among foreign users” that 
the overseas libraries were “a free and open source of truth…”  As a result, “the confused 
and fearful response of the State Department” to charges of subversive books in the 
libraries’ collections had “seriously damaged the effectiveness of the program.”  The 
statement closed with four requirements if the overseas information programs were to 
remain effective: 
(1) The libraries must express in themselves and their services the ideas of 
freedom for which they speak. 
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(2) They must provide a service of uncompromising integrity.  Their usefulness to 
the United States rests on the assurance of their users that they are places in 
which to learn the truth. 
 
(3) The Information Administration must be free to use in its libraries what books 
soever its responsible professional judgment determines are necessary or 
useful to the provision of such a service.  To deny itself the tools it needs to 
serve the United States fro irrelevant reasons of the past associations of 
authors and in fear of domestic criticism is indefensible. 
 
(4) Though no one could justify or would seek to justify the use of the overseas 
libraries to disseminate material harmful to the United States, it is unworkable 
to abandon the simple criterion of whether a book is useful to the purpose of 
ht libraries and to substitute elaborate, irrelevant, and offensive schemes of 
“clearance” of authors.107 
 
 Given the intensity with which the McCarthy hearings had gone after the overseas 
libraries, the actions by the ALA the annual conference were certainly bold.  They also 
garnered considerable praise in the national press.  The New York Times printed the text 
of The Freedom to Read in its entirety, as did the Washington Post, Christian Science 
Monitor, Baltimore Sun, and Norfolk Virginian-Pilot.108  Additionally, the ALA appeared 
to have the support of President Eisenhower, who applauded the ALA’s firm stance 
against censorship in a letter to President Downs that was read in its entirety to the 
librarians attending the conference.  “Our librarians serve the precious liberties of our 
nation: freedom of inquiry, freedom of the spoken and the written word, freedom of 
exchange of ideas,” wrote Eisenhower.  “Any who act as if freedom’s defenses are to be 
found in suppression and suspicion and fear confess a doctrine that is alien to 
America.”109
 Eisenhower’s letter, along with the supportive newspaper accounts across the 
nation, was seen as a reaffirmation of the ALA recent actions.  As a result, the ALA saw 
an opportunity to take advantage of the positive press.  In a September 1953 editorial in 
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ALA Bulletin, Ransom Richardson urged librarians to use the moment to further promote 
the tenants of intellectual freedom.  “The evidence indicates that a great many people 
have suddenly realized for the first time what the library stands for and how much it 
means to them…Suddenly they are aware of the library, like an old star newly fanned to 
brightness in the sky,” he wrote. 
No one can afford to wait.  Now is the time for libraries and library associations 
to put into action widespread, hard-hitting programs.  Now is the time for the 
individual librarian, in city and crossroad, to realize that in his own person he is 
truly a power potential, a public relations program, the son of a great heritage.  
The public is stirring into wakefulness; the librarians have the initiative; the time 
is now.110
 
The position the ALA found itself in at this time was in stark contrast to its position 
before WWII.  Society had certainly changed over the last fifteen years, as had American 
librarianship.  Had the ALA not responded as it did during this time to intellectual 
freedom challenges at home and abroad, it is quite possible that this “time” described by 
Richardson may never have occurred when it did. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Writing in the Wilson Library Bulletin in 1953, Lester Asheim sought to 
differentiate between the selection and censorship of books.  In what has become one of 
the classic pieces on censorship in libraries, Asheim wrote: “Selection seeks to protect the 
right of the reader to read; censorship seeks to protect – not the right – but the reader 
himself from the fancied effects of his reading.  The selector has faith in the intelligence 
of the reader; the censor has faith only in his own.”111  In light of recent events at the 
time of Asheim’s writing, his statement could not have rung more true.  Whether it was 
the banning of The Nation in a high school library or a Howard Fast novel in an overseas 
library, by 1953 the ALA had repeatedly demonstrated its “faith in the intelligence” of 
individuals to make up their own mind when it came to their choices in reading material.   
 In looking at the changes within the ALA and the US Government post-WWII, it 
can be concluded that the confrontation between the two involving the overseas libraries 
in 1953 was virtually inevitable.  After WWII, both groups increasingly found themselves 
on opposing sides of the intellectual freedom fence.  While the ALA had opposed the use 
of libraries as tools for American propaganda before WWII, there was not a commitment 
to defend this ideal throughout the profession as a whole.  However, as the brief peace 
following WWII gave way to the Cold War, acts of censorship within the US galvanized 
the ALA and IFC to fight against these acts of censorship.  The profession had to find its 
way at home before it could truly have an impact outside of the US.  Once this foundation 
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was firmly established, the ALA began to vocalize its opposition to the government’s 
attempts to consciously manipulate public opinion overseas. 
 With the library profession, what had begun as a vague and rather weak Library 
Bill of Rights statement in 1939 had, by the time of the McCarthy hearings, become a 
cornerstone of the profession.  Perhaps one of the most important and indelible aspects of 
this period in library history was the fact that the ALA as a whole, not just a few select 
individuals, publicly stood in opposition at a time when doing so could have dire 
consequences to one’s own livelihood.  Challenges to intellectual freedom certainly 
continued to arise after the Library Bill of Rights, The Freedom to Read, and the 
“Overseas Library Statement,” but thanks to the diligent efforts of the ALA and IFC 
during this period, there was a commitment to intellectual freedom that had did not exist 
in years past.  As a result, librarianship today owes much to the efforts of the ALA and 
IFC, for without this foundation the profession as a whole would be a much weaker 
institution for free thought.  “If we are to gain the esteem we seek for our profession, we 
must be willing to accept the difficult obligations which those ideals imply,” wrote 
Asheim.  As a result of events during this span of library history, the library profession 
became more firmly committed and able to fulfill such obligations, and thus paved the 
way for future defense of intellectual freedom. 
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